PRIMARY SIGNIFICANCE: PROVING
THE CONSUMER'S PERCEPTION
I. INTRODUCTION

The distinctiveness of a trademark is the principal factor courts
have traditionally examined in determining the degree of protection
the mark will be afforded.' Terms for which trademark protection is
sought are customarily grouped as generic, descriptive, suggestive,
and arbitrary or fanciful. 2 Generic terms receive no trademark protection, 3 while arbitrary or fanciful marks are regarded as being inherently distinctive 4 and are protectable and registrable immediately
upon use. 5 Suggestive marks are those which describe or suggest a
characteristic of a product: They are registrable and entitled to the
same protection as arbitrary or fanciful terms.6 Descriptive terms can
neither be registered nor protected unless secondary meaning is
proven. 7 Even if registrable, however, these descriptive terms traditionally have been categorized as "weak" marks, and as such, given a
narrower range of protection than fanciful, arbitrary, or suggestive
8
terms.

See 3 R. CALLMANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES §
69 (3d ed. 1969); 1 J. GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 2.01 (1982); see also
Roselux Chem. Co. v. Parsons Ammonia Co., 299 F.2d 855, 862 (C.C.P.A. 1962) ("Distinctiveness . . . means that the primary meaning of the word . . . is as a designation of source rather
than of a characteristic of the product." (emphasis in original)).
1 J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 11:2 (1973); see, e.g., KingSize, Inc. v. Frank's King Size Clothes, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 1138, 1151 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (complete
discussion of four terms).
I See infra notes 9-16 and accompanying text.
4 See 1 J. MCCARTHY, supranote 2, at § 11:2. "A fanciful mark is a word which is coined for

the express purpose of functioning as a trademark. It could also be any obscure or archaic term
not familiar to buyers." Id. The following trademarks have been determined to be fanciful:
"Kodak," "Sanka," and "Clorox." Id. at § 11:3(D). An arbitrary mark is "a word or symbol
which is in common usage in the language, but which is arbitrarily applied to the goods or
services in question in such a way that it is not descriptive or suggestive." Id. at § 11:2. The
following trademarks are examples of arbitrary marks: "Ivory" as applied to soap, "Bumble Bee"
as applied to tuna and "Dove" as applied to soap.
IId.; see also Lanham Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (1982). This section states in pertinent
part: "nothing in this chapter shall prevent the registration of a mark used by the applicant
which has become distinctive of the applicant's goods in commerce." Id. A trademark does not
have to be registered in order to be protected under the common law of unfair competition. 1 J.
GILSON, supra note 1, at § 1.04 [2] [b]; see 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, at § 2.2.
' 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, at § 11:20 (A). For a complete discussion of why the
category of suggestive marks arose, see id. at § 11:20 (B). An example of a suggestive mark is
"Handi-Wipes."
See infra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
See 1 J. McCARTHY, supra note 2, at § 11:24.
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A generic term is the common name of the product or service
itself.9 It identifies the nature or class of an article, and in essence
answers the question, "What are you?"' 0 A trademark, on the other
hand, identifies the trademarked goods and distinguishes them from
those manufactured or sold by others. 1 A trademark therefore answers the question, "Who are you?' 2 Thus, generic terms and trademarks serve totally different functions.' 3 It is well settled that generic
names are free for all to use and hence may not be appropriated as
trademarks.' 4 Moreover, the Lanham Act provides for
the cancellation of the federal registration of a trademark if it at any
time "becomes the common descriptive name of an article or substance .... .,15 All trademarks are capable of becoming generic

' 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, at § 12:1; see 1 J. GILSON, supra note 1, at § 2:02; Zivin,
Understanding Generic Words, 63 TRADE-MARK REP. 173, 174 (1973).
1 Zivin, supra note 9, at 174-75; see 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, at § 12:1. McCarthy gives
the following example of a generic response to a question: "[A] person is asked 'Who are you?' If
he answers, 'I am a man, homo sapiens', he is not telling the questioner who he is, but what he
is." Id. (emphasis in original).
' Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1982); see 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, at § 12:1.
'2 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, at § 12:1. Referring back to McCarthy's example, supra note
10, the trademark response to the "who are you?" question would be the person's proper name;
e.g., "I am Bob Smith."
13 Id.; see also Folsom & Teply, Trademarked Generic Words, 89 YALE L.J. 1323, 1323
(1980) ("[o]ne of the most important limitations on the legal protection of a word adopted as a
trademark is that it cannot be a term that refers, or has come to be primarily understood by the
consuming public as referring, to a product category").
14 See Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 122 (1938) ("[s]haring in the
goodwill of an article unprotected by patent or trade-mark is the exercise of a right possessed by
all"); Elgin Nat'l Watch Co. v. Illinois Watch Case Co., 179 U.S. 665, 673 (1901) ("no .. .
words can be appropriated as a valid trademark which, from the nature of the fact conveyed by
its primary meaning, others may employ with equal truth and with equal right for the same
purpose"); Delaware & Hudson Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 311, 323 (1872) ("[nlor
can a generic name, or a name merely descriptive of an article of trade, of its qualities,
ingredients, or characteristics, be employed as a trademark and the exclusive use of it be entitled
to legal protection"). This view has been carried through in the Lanham Trademark Act which
provides that "merely descriptive" marks shall be denied registration on the principal register:
"No trade-mark .. .shall be refused registration on the principal register on account of its
nature unless it. . . (e) Consists of a mark which, (1) when applied to the goods of the applicant
is merely descriptive .. .of them .. " Lanham Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1982).
Lanham Act § 14(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (1982). That section provides in pertinent part:
A petition to cancel a registration of a mark. . . may. . . be filed by any person
who believes that he is or will be damaged by the registration of a mark

(c) at any time if the registered mark becomes the common descriptive name of
an article or substance. ...
Id. "Common descriptive name" has been interpreted by the courts as meaning "generic name."
See Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, 611 F.2d 296, 301 (9th Cir. 1979), on
remand, 515 F. Supp. 448 (N.D. Cal. 1981), rev'd and remanded, 684 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1234 (1983); Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc.,
537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976).
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whether they are arbitrary, fanciful, suggestive, or descriptive with
6
secondary meaning. 1
While many courts do not sharply distinguish between generic
names and descriptive terms, the two should not be confused. 17 A
descriptive term is generally understood to be one which "informs the
purchasing public of the characteristics, quality, functions, uses, ingredients, components, or other properties of a product, or conveys
comparable information about a service."' 8 It answers the question
"What does it do?," or "What does it look, sound, feel or taste like?"' 19
Descriptive terms may acquire trademark significance if they attain
secondary meaning.20 This occurs when the term comes to be regarded
21
by the consuming public as designating the source of the product.
Judge Denison's often quoted explanation of secondary meaning is as
valid today as it was in 1912:
There is nothing abstruse or complicated about this theory ....

It

contemplates that a word or phrase originally, and in that sense
primarily, incapable of exclusive appropriation with reference to
See Zivin, supra note 9, at 176.
See I J. GILSON, supra note 1, at § 2.02 (1974); see also CES Publishing Corp. v. St. Regis
Publications, Inc., 531 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1975) (lower court reasoned secondary meaning might
protect generic name); Jewel Tea Co. v. Kraus, 187 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1950) (phrase "generically
descriptive" criticized as meaningless); Redken Laboratories, Inc. v. Clairol Inc., 350 F. Supp.
1301 (C.D. Cal. 1972) (product name "Condition" held generic of process but descriptive of
goods), afJ'd in part, vacated in part, 501 F.2d 1403 (9th Cir. 1974); Application of Automatic
Radio Mfg. Co., 404 F.2d 1391 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (phrase "generically descriptive" criticized as
meaningless).
1S 1 J. GILsON, supra note 1, § 2.03, at 2-31.
l9Id. § 2:02, at 2-8.1. "In addition, a mark is 'descriptive' if it is descriptive of... the class
of users of the goods . ..or of the end effect upon the user." 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, at §
11.5(B); see also 1 J. GILSON, supra note 1, § 2.03, at 2-31. Some examples of terms which have
been considered descriptive are "lite" as applied to beer, "feathercombs" as applied to hair
retaining combs, and "steak and brew" as applied to restaurants. See Miller Brewing Co. v.
Falstaff Brewing Corp., 655 F.2d 5 (1st Cir. 1981); Feathercombs, Inc. v. Solo Prods. Corp., 306
F.2d 251 (2d Cir. 1962); Longchamps, Inc. v. Eig., 167 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 81 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
20 See, e.g., Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 305 U.S. 315, 336
(1938) (trademark or tradename which has acquired secondary meaning in addition to its
descriptive character entitled to protection). A descriptive term may be registered under § 2 (f) of
the Lanham Act if it becomes distinctive. 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (f) (1982); see supra note 5 for partial
text of statute. Distinctive in § 2 (f) means the same thing as secondary meaning. Application of
Automatic Radio Mfg. Co., 404 F.2d 1391 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
21 See 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, at § 11.9; see also Salton Inc. v. Cornwall Corp., 477 F.
Supp. 975, 988 (D.N.J. 1979) ("[s]econdary meaning comes about when a phrase or name has
been used so long and so exclusively by one producer that to consumers of the item the word or
phrase now means that producer's product"); Le Sportsac, Inc. v. Dockside Research, Inc., 478
F. Supp. 602, 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) ("secondary meaning connotes the association in the mind of
the public of the trademark with the source of the goods"); American Basketball Ass'n v. AMF
Voit, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 981, 986 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (" 'secondary meaning'... is equivalent to an
association between the 'trademark' and the supposed source of the goods such that an ordinary
man would immediately associate the goods with their source").
16
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an article on the market, because geographically or otherwise descriptive, might nevertheless have been used so long and so exclusively by one producer with reference to his article that, in that
trade and to that branch of the purchasing public, the word or
phrase had come to mean that the article was his product; in other
words, had come to be, to them, his trade-mark. So it was said that
the word had come to have a secondary meaning, although this
phrase, 'secondary meaning,' seems not happily chosen, because, in
the limited field, this new meaning is primary rather than second22
ary; that is to say, it is, in that field, the natural meaning.

While all generic terms are descriptive, however, all descriptive terms
are not generic. 23 The difference between the two is largely perceptual: If the mark is perceived one way, it is generic, if another, it is
descriptive. While it is difficult to draw this distinction with any
precision it is a crucial one. If the term is determined to be generic it
can never be given trademark protection, but if determined to bedescriptive, it can be given trademark protection upon proof of sec4
ondary meaning.
The modern trademark functions on three different levels-"as
an indication of origin or ownership, as a guarantee of constancy, and
as a medium of advertisement. ' 25 A trademark has been described as
"a merchandising short-cut which induces a purchaser to select what
he wants, or what he has been led to believe he wants. ' 26 As such,they
are valuable commodities. Trademark owners must thus be ever
wary; a determination of genericness would strip them of a very
valuable asset.

21 C. & C. Merriam Co. v. Saalfield, 198 F. 369, 373 (6th Cir. 1912), aJJ'd and modified,
238 F. 1 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 243 U.S. 651 (1917).
21 Zivin, supra note 9, at 175; see Leavenworth, Lost Monopolies, 32 Ta.DE-MARK BULL. 329
(1937), reprinted in 61 TanDE-MARK REP. 28 (1971).
21 1 J. McCARTHY, supra note 2, at § 12:5; see supra note 5. It is possible, but extremely
difficult, to reclaim a generic term from the public domain. See, e.g., Singer Mfg. Co. v. Briley,
207 F.2d 519 (5th Cir. 1953) (term Singer, held generic in 1895, recaptured from public domain
by continuous use on variety of products). For a complete discussion of the difficulties encountered in reclaiming a generic term, see 1 J. McCARTHY, supra note 2, at § 12:10.
25 3 R. CALLMANN, supra note 1, at § 65; see 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, at § 3:1(B).
Gilson, on the other hand, sees trademarks as serving six different and exclusive functions: "(a)
designates the source or origin of a particular product or service, even though the source is to the
consumer anonymous; (b) denotes a particular standard of quality. . . ; (c) identifies a product
. . . and distinguishes it from . . . others; (d) symbolizes the good will of its owner . . . ; (e)
represents a substantial advertising investment . . . ; (f) protects the public from confusion and
deception ....
" 1 J. GILSON, supra note 1, at § 1.03; see also Diamond, The Historical
Development of Trademarks, 65 TRADE-MARK RaP. 265 (1975) (discusses historical functions of
trademarks).
26 Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942).
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II. DOCTRINE OF GENERICNESS

The seminal decision on genericness came from the Southern
District Court of New York in 1921.27 In Bayer Co. v. United Drug
Co.,2 8 Judge Learned Hand identified the test for determining
whether an arbitrary name has become generic as "[W]hat do the
buyers understand by the word for whose use the parties are contending? If they understand by it only the kind of goods sold, then . . .it
makes no difference whatever what efforts the plaintiff has made to
get them to understand more. '29 The court pointed out that to consumers the term "aspirin" meant only a product, not a manufacturer,
and therefore "aspirin" was generic as to that segment of the population, and could not be given trademark protection. 30 Judge Hand did
hold, however, that the term "aspirin" continued to serve as a source
indicator to manufacturing chemists, physicians, and retail druggists,
31
and thus was a valid trademark only with regard to that group.
According to Judge Hand the test was clear: If the term denoted only
the product, it was generic and therefore not amenable to trademark
protection, but if it served as a source indicator, trademark protection
32
was warranted.
The law rarely remains black and white and the doctrine of
genericness is no exception. Seventeen years after Judge Hand's Bayer
decision, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether
National Biscuit Company held the exclusive right to the term "Shredded Wheat, 33 The Court, in holding the term "Shredded Wheat" to
be generic, did not apply the "only product" standard formulated by
Judge Hand, but rather determined that a trademark is generic if its
"primary significance" in the minds of consumers is to indicate the
4
product rather than its source.3
The National Biscuit Company manufactured "a product composed of whole wheat which ha[d] been boiled, partially dried, then
27 Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
28

Id.

2 Id. at 509.

30Id. at 510. Two factors considered by the court were first, that aspirin was a patented
product until 1917, and second, that there was no alternative name for the product other than its
chemical name, acetyl salicylic acid. Id. at 511.
" Id. at 510. The court held that in direct sales to the public the defendant could use the
term "aspirin" to describe its product, while in sales to professional customers, the defendant
could not use the term "aspirin" at all, but had to designate it as acetyl salicylic acid. Id. at 514.
32 Id. at 509; see supra text accompanying note 29.
" Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938) [hereinafter cited as Shredded
Wheat].
l4
Id. at 118.
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drawn or pressed out into thin shreds and baked" in pillow-shaped
form.3 5 This process was covered by a patent which expired in 1912.36
Beginning in 1912 and ending in 1919, the Kellogg Company manu3
factured a similar product. 37 In 1927 Kellogg resumed production. 1
In 1928, National Biscuit brought an unfair competition action
against two of Kellogg's dealers . 3 This suit was discontinued by stipulation, and in 1932 National Biscuit brought a federal action seeking
an injunction against alleged unfair competition by Kellogg. 40 The
district court dismissed the bill in 1935, finding that the name "Shredded Wheat" was a descriptive term and that the National Biscuit
Company had not proven "passing off" or deception. 4' The Court held
that "upon the expiration of the . . . patent . . . the name of the
patented article passed into the public domain. 42 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the decree of the district court,
but upon rehearing vacated its own decision and reversed the decision
of the district court, directing it " 'to enter a decree enjoining [Kellogg] from the use of the name 'Shredded Wheat' as its trade-name
43
and from advertising or offering [it] for sale' " in the biscuit form.
The Supreme Court found that National Biscuit had not acquired
the right to the exclusive use of the term "Shredded Wheat" as its
trade name. 44 The Court set forth two bases for its decision. Justice
Brandeis first determined that upon the expiration of the patent, "the
name 'Shredded Wheat,' as well as the product, the process and the
machinery employed in making it, ha[d] been dedicated to the public."-45 The Court stated that during the patent period "Shredded
Wheat" was the common name of the patented product, and as such,

11 Id. at 113.
36 Id. at 117-18.
37 Id. at 114. Kellogg's final product was similar in form to that made by National Biscuit,
but its manufacture was different in that the wheat was reduced to dough before shredding.
38

Id.

39
40

Id.
Id.

41

Id.

42

Id.

43 Id. at 114-15 (quoting National Biscuit Co. v. Kellogg Co., 91 F.2d 150, 152 (3d Cir.

1937), rev'd, 305 U.S. 111 (1938)).
"

Id. at 116.

Id. at 117-18 (citing Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169 (1896)). The Singer
Court had held that after the expiration of the patent, the patented device fell into the public
domain and that "along with the public ownership ... there must also necessarily pass to the
public the generic designation of the thing ... ." Singer, 163 U.S. at 185.
45

'I
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the term "Shredded Wheat" was generic long before the patent ex46
pired.
The other basis for the Court's decision has had profound effects
on trademark law. The Court stated that " 'Shredded Wheat' . . . is
the generic term of the article, which describes it with a fair degree of
accuracy; and is the term by which the biscuit in pillow-shaped form
is generally known by the public. '47 Justice Brandeis found that "to
establish a trade name in the term 'shredded wheat' the plaintiff must
show more than a subordinate meaning which applies to it. It must
show that the primary significance of the term in the minds of the
consuming public is not the product but the producer.- 48 Although
courts over the years have not always explicitly cited the Shredded
Wheat rationale, 49 it is now clear that the "primary significance"
analysis set forth by the Court in 1938 is the test to be applied in
determining whether any term-be it arbitrary, fanciful, suggestive,
46 Shredded Wheat, 305 U.S. at 118. This Comment will not explore further the Court's first

basis for its determination of genericness. For a discussion of the effect of patent expiration upon
trademarks see Greenberg, The Effect of Patent Expiration on Trade Mark Rights, 25 J. PAT.
OFF. Soc'Y 564 (1943). Zivin notes that, in any event, the patent issue added nothing to the
reasoning of the Shredded Wheat Court. Zivin, supra note 9, at 185.
17 Shredded Wheat, 305 U.S. at 116. The Court's language lent itself to confusion by failing
to distinguish between generic terms that are incapable of trademark significance, and descriptive terms that can become valid trademarks if they develop a secondary meaning. Consequently, some courts have read the Shredded Wheat opinion as setting forth the test for
determining when a descriptive term has acquired secondary meaning, rather than as the test for
genericness. See, e.g., King-Size, Inc. v. Frank's King Size Clothes, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 1138,
1156 (S.D. Tex. 1982) ("In order to establish secondary meaning, the '[plaintiffs] must show
more than a subordinate meaning which applies to it. [Plaintiffs] must show that the primary
significance of the term in the minds of the consuming public is not the product but the
producer. "'(citing Shredded Wheat, 305 U.S. at 118)); accord American Footwear Corp. v.
General Footwear Co., 609 F.2d 655 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 951 (1979); Mother's
Restaurants Inc. v. Mother's Bakery, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 847 (W.D.N.Y. 1980); Clarke v. KMart, 473 F. Supp. 1299 (W.D. Pa. 1979); Ralston Purina Co. v. Thomas J. Lipton, Inc., 341 F.
Supp. 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). But cf. Shredded Wheat, 305 U.S. at 118 ("[t]here is no basis here
for applying the doctrine of secondary meaning").
48 Shredded Wheat, 305 U.S. at 118. National Biscuit contended that it had the exclusive
right to the name "Shredded Wheat" because the term had acquired "secondary meaning." Id.
But such consumer association between the product name and the product's source when there is
only one manufacturer of the product, is merely "de facto secondary meaning" and does not
indicate that the term is not generic. Simply stated:
If a term is proven to be generic, evidence of purported buyer association of the
term with a single source will not change the result. Any such evidence is called "de
facto secondary meaning". De facto secondary meaning might arise during the
period when a seller is the single source .. . .[W]hen one source is the only seller of
a product, the public might associate the generic name of the product with the single
source seller merely because there is no one else on the market.
1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, at § 12:15.
41 See infra note 92 and accompanying text.
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or descriptive with secondary meaning-has expired into generic50
ness.
The genericness doctrine itself has undergone little change since
Shredded Wheat. A continuing source of difficulty, however, is determining what proofs are indicative of the "primary significance of the
term in the minds of the consuming public." 5' This Comment will
examine the proof problems encountered in applying this standard.
This can best be done by identifying and analyzing the proof accepted
by the courts in three cases: (1) American Thermos Products Co. v.
Aladdin Industries, Inc.; 52(2) E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v.
Yoshida International,Inc.;53 and (3) Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General
54
Mills Fun Group, Inc.
A. American Thermos Products Co. v. Aladdin Industries, Inc.
(Thermos)5
In King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Industries, Inc. ,5 in
1963, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court
of Connecticut's Thermos ruling that the registered trademark "Thermos" had become generic. 57 The Second Circuit applied the "primary
significance" analysis and concluded that there had been sufficient
evidence before the district court to sustain a determination of genericness. 58 In finding the trademark "Thermos" to be generic, the district court had traced the history of King-Seeley's use of the trademark

50 See, e.g., Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 684 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1234 (1983); Helene Curtis Indus. v. Church & Dwight Co., 560
F.2d 1325 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1070 (1978); King-Seeley Thermos Co. v.
Aladdin Indus., Inc. 321 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1963); Feathercombs, Inc. v. Solo Prods. Corp., 306
F.2d 251 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 910 (1962). But see Marks v. Polaroid Corp., 129 F.
Supp. 243, 270 (D. Mass. 1955) (court used stricter Bayer standard, stating that to prove
genericness, "[one] must show that to the consuming public as a whole the word has lost all its
trademark significance" (emphasis in original)), af'd, 237 F.2d 428 (1st Cir. 1956).
-1 Shredded Wheat, 305 U.S. at 118.
52 207 F. Supp. 9 (D. Conn. 1962), aff'd sub nom. King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin

Indus., Inc., 321 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1963) [hereinafter cited as Thermos].
53 393 F. Supp. 502 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Teflon].
195 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 634 (N.D. Cal. 1977), rev'd and remanded, 611 F.2d 296 (9th Cir.
1979), on remand, 515 F. Supp. 448 (N.D. Cal. 1981), rev'd and remanded, 684 F.2d 1316 (9th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1234 (1983) [hereinafter cited as District Court I].
55 Thermos, 207 F. Supp. at 9.
" 321 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1963) [hereinafter cited as King-Seeley].
57

Id.

- Id. at 581.
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and analyzed the effect that this usage had on the public's understanding and usage of the term. 9 The court examined three separate time
periods.6 0 They found that during the first period, from 1907 to 1923,
King-Seeley had conducted an "educational program to popularize
'Thermos bottle' as the name of that product .... .,61 Its advertising
and literature during this period referred to the product as "Thermos
bottle" without any other generic term such as "vacuum bottle.' 2 The
court found that editorials and other publications from this period
evidenced the public's usage and understanding of the word "Therby 1923 "Thermos" as the name of a product, and determined that
63
mos" had acquired "firm roots" as a generic term.
In 1923, apparently because of an intimation in an earlier district
court opinion that the term "Thermos" might be generic, 4 KingSeeley began to use "vacuum" or "vacuum bottle" in conjunction with
the word "Thermos. 6' 5 King-Seeley continued to use the word "Thermos" in a generic fashion, however, in the text of its catalogues and in
the description of its products.6 6 The court stated that during this
second period, from 1923 to 1953, the evidence showed there were
hundreds of literary and editorial usages of the term "Thermos" as a
generic term.6 7 Although cognizant of the widespread misuse of the
term "Thermos," King-Seeley failed at that time to take affirmative
action to seek out generic uses by the public, and protested only those
of which it happened to become aware.6 8 The court described KingSeeley as concerned about the possibility that such uses might render
its trademark generic, yet unwilling to protest "for fear of creating ill-

"o Thermos, 207 F. Supp. at 15-19.
0 Id.
11Id. at 15.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 16.
8'American Thermos Bottle Co. v. W.T. Grant Co., 279 F. 151 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 282 F. 426
(1st Cir. 1922). W.T. Grant had attempted to argue that the "Thermos" trademark had become
generic. The district court did not consider this issue because it had not been properly pleaded,
but did note that the validity of the "Thermos" trademark was "not absolutely free from doubt."
Id. at 152.
65 King-Seeley, 321 F.2d at 579.
8 Thermos, 207 F. Supp. at 13, 17.
67 Id. The court examined newspapers, magazines, treatises, textbooks, encyclopedias, and
dictionaries in which the term "Thermos" was used generically. Id.
6 Id. During this 30-year period, King-Seeley wrote less than two or three dozen protest
letters with regard to nontrade generic uses of "Thermos." The corporation did, however, notify
those in the trade using the term generically that it was a trademark. Id.
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will and for fear of losing the economic advantage" it gained as a
69
result of this "widespread free advertising.
During the last time period examined by the district court, from
1954 to 1957, the company changed its name, used the "Thermos"
trademark on products other than vacuum bottles, and intensified its
policing activities. 70 The court found that these efforts had come too
late, since by 1953 "the generic use of 'thermos' had become firmly
impressed as a part of the everyday language of the American public." 7'
Although the district court based its holding on evidence detailing King-Seeley's lack of diligence in policing its mark and the resulting generic public usage during the three critical periods, the court
also considered proof of the public's current usage and understanding
of the term. 72 The presentation by the parties of the evidence regarding current public usage varied, based upon their divergent under73
standings of the law.
The plaintiff, King-Seeley, believed that the defendant, in order
to prove genericness, had "the burden of showing that 'Thermos'
ha[d] only a descriptive use and that to the consuming public as a
whole 'Thermos' ha[d] lost all of its trade-mark significance. '74 Accordingly, King-Seeley introduced evidence aimed at proving that an
"appreciable minority segment" of consumers perceived "Thermos" as

" Id. at 13. The court examined memoranda from King-Seeley's files which apparently
evidenced its awareness that the trademark "Thermos" was in danger of becoming a common
word. Id. at 17 n.4. In a letter dated July 23, 1946, the Vice President in Charge of Sales
addressed the problem of misuse of the company trademark, and stated that the consensus was
that affirmative action was indeed necessary. The court noted that despite this consensus, little
was done with regard to nontrade generic uses. Id.
70 Id. at 19. The plaintiff changed the name of the company from American Thermos Bottle
Company to the American Thermos Products Company. Before the plaintiffs diversification
program its product line consisted of only insulated containers and accessories for those containers. During the period from 1957 to 1961, the plaintiff wrote 3,678 protest letters, and in 1959
engaged the services of a clipping bureau to identify editorial and literary descriptive uses of
"Thermos" in the media. Id.
71

Id.

72 Id.

Id.
Id. at 22 (emphasis in original). King-Seeley relied upon Marks v. Polaroid Corp., 129 F.
Supp. 243 (D. Mass. 1955), ajfd, 273 F.2d 428 (1st Cir. 1956), as well as Selchow v. Baker, 93
N.Y. 59 (1883)), an earlier case which had held that an arbitrary or fanciful word is entitled to
protection, notwithstanding" 'that it has become so generally known that it has been adopted by
the public as the ordinary appellation of the article.' " Thermos, 207 F. Supp. at 22 (quoting
Selchow v. Baker, 93 N.Y. 59, 68-69 (1883)). The plaintiff argued that "so long as the word is a
trademark to some members of the public there remains the possibility that someone may be
deceived." Id.
73
14
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a trademark specifying their product.7 5 To this end, the plaintiff
introduced hundreds of media examples where the term "Thermos"
was used in its proper trademark forms. 76 To further support its
contention that a substantial minority of consumers recognized the
"Thermos" trademark's significance, King-Seeley surveyed 3,650 consumers to establish whether they were familiar with any trademark or
brand names for vacuum bottles.7 7 Approximately one-third of those
surveyed responded "Thermos. 7 8 The court found that despite inherent flaws in this survey, it was corroborative of the plaintiff's allegarecognized
tion that an appreciable minority segment of consumers
79
"Thermos" as the trademark of King-Seeley's products.
The defendants alleged that a generic understanding of the term
"Thermos" by a "large majority of consumers" would render the term
generic, notwithstanding the fact that there may have been an appreciable minority of consumers for whom the term functioned as a

71 Thermos, 207 F. Supp.
at 21. The plaintiff believed that if it succeeded in showing
trademark significance to a minority segment, the defendant would be unable to meet its burden
of showing that the term had no trademark significance to the public as a whole. Id. at 22.
16 Id. at 19. The court noted, however, that for the most part these were uses made to appear
in advertising aimed at the trade or in articles in trade publications. Since the defendant had
conceded that the trade recognized and used "Thermos" as the plaintiffs trademark, the court
gave this evidence little weight. Id.
77 Id. at 20. The plaintiffs survey asked the following question: "Please name any trademark or brand names, with which you are familiar, for vacuum bottles, insulated bottles or
other containers, which keep the contents hot or cold." Id.
11 Id. at 21.
71 Id. The court found fault with the survey in that the nature of the question focused the
mind of the interviewee upon trademarks or brand names, and thus "left little or no opportunity
for the revelation of a generic or descriptive use of 'thermos' in the answer." Furthermore, the
interviewees did not constitute a representative cross section of the consuming public, and those
who were chosen to testify were generally aware of the issues and had been interviewed by
counsel. Id. The plaintiff failed in almost every respect to conform with the principles governing
the admissibility of survey evidence set forth in the MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, § 2.712
(rev. ed. 1982), which states:
The offeror has the burden of establishing that a proffered poll was conducted
in accordance with accepted principles of survey research, that is, that the proper
universe was examined, that a representative sample was drawn from that universe,
and that the mode of questioning the interviewees was correct. He should be
required to show that the persons conducting the survey were recognized experts; the
data gathered was accurately reported; and the sample design, the questionnaire,
and the interviewing were in accordance with generally accepted standards of
objective procedure and statistics in the field of such surveys. Normally this showing
will be made through the testimony of the persons responsible for the various parts of
the survey.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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trademark.80 The defendant, like King-Seeley, introduced hundreds
of excerpts, but these showed thousands of generic uses of the term
"Thermos."-8' In addition, Aladdin utilized the services of a philologist
who explained his theory of why the public so readily accepted "Thermos" as a generic term.8 2 Aladdin also introduced a survey designed to
measure consumer usage of the term "Thermos.."83 The survey was

80 Thermos, 207 F. Supp. at 22. The defendant relied upon Bayer, 272 F. at 505, Shredded

Wheat, 305 U.S. at 111,
and DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co., 85 F.2d 75, 82 (2d
Cir.) (Second Circuit, following Bayer rationale, invalidated "Cellophane" trademark as generic), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 601 (1936); see supra notes 27-48 for discussions of Bayer and
Shredded Wheat.
81 Thermos, 207 F. Supp. at 20. The court concluded that this evidence reflected the
widespread use and understanding of "Thermos" as a generic term. Both the plaintiff and the
defendant introduced definitions of the word "Thermos" from a number of dictionaries. This
evidence, however, was inconclusive. Most of the definitions categorized the term "Thermos" as
an adjective meaning "vacuum insulated," as a noun designating "vacuum insulated" products,
and as a trademark. The court stated that the plaintiff "may rightfully claim that the mention of
the trade-mark use is a recognition of the existence of the trade-mark; but it is equally proper for
the defendant to assert that it also presents the word as one generically used." Id.
12 Id. The court found the expert's testimony "logical and persuasive." His theory was that
public acceptance of the term "Thermos" as generic was "in part attributable to a characteristic
of the general public, and a familiar phenomenon in linguistics, that people tend to adopt and
use the shortest and simplest word which will adequately communicate the idea or call to mind
the object or product that they want to tell about." Id.
83 See id. at 21. The defendant's survey satisfied the criteria set forth in the MANUAL FOR
COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 79. The following questions were asked:
Are you familiar with the type of container that is used to keep liquids, like
soup, coffee, tea and lemonade, hot or cold for a period of time?
Have you yourself ever used (or filled) such a container - that is, the type to
keep liquids cold or hot?
What was the occasion for using such a container?
If you were going to buy one of these containers tomorrow - that is, the type
that keeps food and beverages hot or cold - what type of store would you select to
make your purchase?
What would you ask for - that is, what would you tell the clerk you wanted?
Can you think of any other words that you would use to ask for a container that
keeps liquids hot or cold?
If you were going to describe one of these containers to a friend of yours what words would come to your mind first to describe a container that keeps liquids
hot or cold?
Do you, or does anyone else within your household own a container such as we
have been talking about?
How many are owned by all members of your household?
What do you call this (these) containers?
Do you know the names of any manufacturers who make these containers that
keep liquds [sic] hot or cold?
Can you name any trade-marks or brand names that are used on these containers?
Thermos, 207 F. Supp. at 21 n.8.
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conducted among persons who indicated an awareness of containers
used to keep liquids hot or cold. 84 Seventy-five percent of those familiar with these types of containers called such containers a thermos,
eleven percent responded with the term "vacuum bottle," and twelve
85
percent were aware that "Thermos" had trademark significance.
The district court held for Aladdin, determining that it was not
required to prove that "Thermos" had lost all its trademark significance to the consuming public as a whole, but only that the term had
become generic to a great majority of consumers.86 Instead of relying
upon the Shredded Wheat primary significance analysis, the court
engaged in a lengthy and at times strained analysis of the Bayer 7
88
decision to reach this conclusion.
The district court focused on King-Seeley's acts of using the
trademark generically, on documents and testimony attesting to KingSeeley's lack of diligence in policing the mark, and on evidence in
periodicals, publications, dictionaries, and consumer files of the resulting generic understanding and usage by the public.8 9 The district
court viewed the proffered surveys only as corroborating the decision
it had already reached based on the aforementioned evidence. 90
Thermos thus became the "first case to declare a once arbitrary
trademark generic where the product to which it was applied had not
enjoyed a patent monopoly." 9' The Second Circuit, however, applied
the primary significance analysis and stated in its affirmance that a
term is generic if its primary significance in the minds of the consum-

11Thermos, 207

F. Supp. at 21.

81 Id. at 21-22.

86 Id. at 25.
87 The court also discussed DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Products Co., 85 F.2d 75 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 601 (1936). Thermos, 207 F. Supp. at 23-28.
88 Thermos, 207 F. Supp. at 23-28. A thorough reading of the Bayer decision uncovers little
to support the Thermos court's interpretation. The Bayer court begins its analysis with a
statement outlining the burden of proof upon the defendant: "Prima facie I should say, since the
word is coined and means nothing by itself, that the defendant must show that it means only the
kind of drug to which it applies." Bayer, 272 F. at 509 (emphasis added). This statement is
hardly supportive of the Thermos court's interpretation of the defendant's burden.
" See supra text accompanying notes 59-63.
90 Thermos, 207 F. Supp. at 22.
91 Swann, The Validity of Dual Functioning Trademarks: Genericism Tested by Consumer
UnderstandingRather Than By Consumer Use, 69 TRADE-MARK REP. 357, 365 (1979); cJ. Bayer,
272 F. at 505 (aspirin patented until 1917); DuPont Cellophane, 85 F.2d at 77 (cellophane also
patented).
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ing public is the product and not the producer. 2 Under this rationale,
if a great majority of the consuming public considered the term to be
product indicative and a minority considered it source indicative, the
term would be generic. 9 3 In the instant case, where a great majority of
the consuming public considered the term "Thermos" to be the name
of a product and not an indication of its source, the term had become
4
generic.1
In reaching its decision, the circuit court gave less weight to
King-Seeley's acts of commission and omission than had the district
court, and relied more heavily upon Aladdin's survey.9 5 The court
stated that "whether the appropriation by the public was due to
highly successful educational and advertising campaigns or to lack of
diligence in policing or not is of no consequence." 9'6 What was of
consequence, according to the circuit court, was "what the public's
understanding is of the word that it uses." 9 7 The circuit court agreed
with the district court's conclusion that the defendant's survey showed
that the great majority of the public using "Thermos" had attached no
trademark significance to the term.9 8 While the district court considered this survey as only corroborating its holding, the circuit court
apparently believed that the survey alone was sufficient to prove that
the primary significance of the term "Thermos" was its indication of a
product, rather than its source.9 9

12 King-Seeley, 321 F.2d at 581. The Second Circuit cites the following language from its
earlier decision, Feathercombs, Inc. v. Solo Prods. Corp., 306 F.2d 251 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 910 (1962), as setting forth the standard to be applied in any determination of
genericness:
[Al mark is not generic merely because it has some significance to the public as an
indication of the nature or class of an article ....
In order to become generic the
principalsignificance of the word must be its indication of the nature or class of an
article, rather than an indication of its origin.
King-Seeley, 321 F.2d at 580 (emphasis in original). This is nothing more than the Shredded
Wheat "primary significance" standard. See supra text accompanying notes 48-50. The Second
Circuit concluded that in the instant case "the primary significance to the public of the word
'thermos' is its indication ... of an article rather than as an indication of its source .
KingSeeley, 321 F.2d at 581.
o See King-Seeley, 321 F.2d at 580.
IId. Limitations were placed, however, on the use of term "Thermos." Any use by the
defendant of the word "Thermos," had to be preceded by "Aladdin's," it could only use thermos
with a lower case "t," and it could never use the words "original" or "genuine." Id. at 581.
5 Id. at 579-80.
9I Id. at 579.
SId. at 580.
s Id. at 579-80.
IId. at 580.
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Therefore, a party attempting to prove genericness could reasonably presume that while evidence of misuse of the trademark or lack
of diligence in policing it would be helpful, it would not be necessary
if the party were able to prove by a survey that the primary significance of the trademark in question was product and not producer.
After Thermos, a trademark apparently could become generic based
upon the public's perception of it, regardless of anything the producer
had or had not done to preserve its mark. The defendant in E.I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Yoshida International, Inc. took just
this position.
B. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Yoshida International, Inc.
00
(Teflon) 1
In Teflon, the District Court for the Eastern District of New York
held the "Teflon" trademark to be nongeneric.' 0 ' Dating from 1946,
E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Company (DuPont) was the owner of
the registered trademark "Teflon.

' 10 2

In 1969, Yoshida International,

Inc. (YKK) introduced the "Eflon" zipper into the American market.10 3 DuPont subsequently brought an action against YKK alleging
trademark infringement, 10 4 and YKK defended by arguing that the
"Teflon" trademark had become generic.1 05
The court found the primary significance analysis to be the
proper standard against which a determination of genericness should
be weighed. 06° Characterizing YKK's burden as "a heavy one," the

1o0Teflon,

393 F. Supp. at 502.
101Id.
102 Id. at 505. The term -'Teflon" was coined by DuPont before 1946 as an arbitrary or
fanciful term. Id. at 506. DuPont was the owner of seven U.S. trademark registrations of
"Teflon," which were all in effect at the time of the litigation. Id.
103 Id. at 506. The court, however, was not convinced that Yoshida International, Inc. (YKK)
had adopted the term without the intent of deceiving the public; since the defendant's intentions
were ambiguous all doubts about intent were resolved against YKK. Id. at 509. YKK sought
trademark registration of "Eflon" in the United States Patent Office, and DuPont filed opposition proceedings. These proceedings were stayed when DuPont filed the trademark infringement
action. Id. at 506.
14 Id. at 505. DuPont instituted the suit in January 1971, two years after YKK had first
introduced the "Eflon" zipper into the American market. Id. at 506. Based primarily on the
similarity of the marks and the strength of the "Teflon" mark, the court concluded that DuPont
had prevailed on its claim of trademark infringement. Id. at 523.
1o, Id. at 509. DuPont did not dispute YKK's contention that, if proven, the genericness claim
would be a complete defense to the trademark infringement action. Id. at 523.
l0 Id. The court relied upon Feathercombs, Inc. v. Solo Prods. Corp., 306 F.2d 251 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 910 (1962); see supra text accompanying note 58.
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court asserted that all "doubts should be resolved in favor of the
trademark owner .... ",107 The court's basis for this assertion was its
finding that the "Teflon" trademark was a strong mark, 10 8 and that
DuPont had "over the years conducted a vigilant trademark education
and protection program." 109 The court found that DuPont had taken
great care to ensure that its mark was accompanied by an appropriate
generic phrase in all advertising of its product. 1 0 Distinguishing the
instant case from Thermos, the court noted that, unlike King-Seeley,
DuPont had never acquiesced to generic usage by others."' While
noting that these factors were not controlling, the court found that
they were sufficient to require YKK to make a "clear and convincing"
showing that the primary significance of "Teflon" was to indicate
12
product rather than source."
DuPont sold its resins to industrial buyers who in turn used the
resins on their non-stick products." 3 The General Electric Company
4
was one of the manufacturers who had used the "Teflon" mark."
YKK cited as "dispositive evidence" letters from General Electric's
consumer correspondence file demonstrating that their consumers
continued to associate the word "Teflon" with General Electric's nonstick coating six years after General Electric had ceased using the
"Teflon" mark." 5 YKK apparently hoped to prove thereby that consumers understood "Teflon" as meaning nothing more than non-stick

107Teflon, 593 F. Supp. at 523. The court noted that the trademark owner should be given
the benefit of the doubt especially when "he can demonstrate having taken appropriate action to
counteract or resist indiscriminate use of the mark by the public." Id. at 523-24. The court
recognized, however, that the owner's intent is not a controlling factor. Id. at 524; accord 3 R.
CALLMANN, supra note 1, at § 74.2.
101Teflon, 393 F. Supp. at 512. The Teflon court stated that "[w]here the public has been
educated to recognize and accept a particular mark as the hallmark for a particular source of
that product, or the mark itself is inherently unique or has been the subject of wide advertisement, it is a strong trademark." Id.; see also 3 R. CALLMANN, supra note 1, at § 74.2 (mark's
distinctiveness measured by its relative strength or weakness).
109Teflon, 393 F. Supp. at 507. DuPont made efforts to instruct both its "Teflon" resin
salesmen and its customers on the proper usage of the "Teflon" trademark. DuPont also occasionally engaged in protective advertising. Id.
"o Id. at 528.
I" Id.

112 Id. at 527-28.
113 Id. at 506. Many of these manufacturers participated in a certification program, whereby
DuPont certified the finish as "DuPont approved" and the manufacturers were then able to
advertise their products under the "Teflon" mark. Id.
114 Id. at 524.
15 Id. General Electric had stopped using the "Teflon" mark and had begun to use the term
"GE Double Non-Stick Coating." Id.
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coating. The court found, however, that the letters evidenced no more
than an association in the minds of a handful of consumers between
non-stick coating and "Teflon." 16 The court determined that this
association in itself was not evidence of genericness, and therefore
117
disregarded the evidence.
YKK also introduced various advertisements, court decisions,
and U.S. patents which employed the term "Teflon" in a generic
manner. 18 The court, however, found these to be isolated examples of
generic usage and, as such, insufficient to satisfy YKK's burden of
proving that the primary significance of "Teflon" in the minds of the
consuming public was product and not source."'
YKK's principal proof consisted of two professionally conducted
surveys. 120 Both surveys were modeled after the survey that had been
accepted by the Thermos court as corroborative of its finding that
"Thermos" was generic to a majority of consumers. 121 The first Teflon
survey was conducted among adult women who indicated an awareness of " 'kitchen pots and pans that have their inside surfaces coated
by chemical substances to keep grease or food from sticking to
them.' "122 When asked to give the name of these pots and pans,
86.1% of this "aware" group mentioned "Teflon" or "Teflon II"
exclusively. 23 When further asked what "name they would use to

116

Id.

Id.
I1 The court observed that "[i]t cannot be thought unusual for a generic term describing
the nature or class of an article (non-stick coatings and finishes) to be associated with its major
indicator of source (TEFLON), but it does not necessarily follow that the public has lost sight of
the distinction." Id. The court disregarded the letters noting that there was no way of determining how representative they were. Id. at 524 n.48.
118 Id.
"9 Id. The court attached no significance to the court decisions and U.S. patents finding that
these reflected only "how a handful of people might refer to TEFLON . . . in a highly technical
use and giving no indication of whether they also understood the term to be a trademark." Id. at
524 n.49. As to the advertisements and other published material proffered by the defendant, the
court stated that proof of "individual instances of advertiser or industrial use have little probative
value on overall public understanding." Id. at 524-25.
121 Id. at 525. These surveys were in conformance with the guidelines for the introduction of
survey evidence. See supra note 79.
121 See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
122 Teflon, 393 F. Supp. at 525 (quoting Def. Exh. P, pp. 8, 11 & Table 1). Of those women
questioned 90.6% responded that they were aware of such products. Id. According to accepted
survey practices, " '[a]ware' respondents [are] those who [indicate] an awareness of the subject
matter of the survey by responding in some affirmative fashion to an initial question" designed to
determine whether they fit into the target universe. See id. at 525 n.51 (quoting Def. Exh. P, pp.
9, 11).
123 Id. at 525.
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describe the pots and pans to a store clerk or friend," 71.7% responded only "Teflon" or "Teflon II." ' 24 DuPont was identified as the
25
manufacturer by 7.3% of these "aware" women.
The second survey was substantially a duplication of the first, the
sole difference being the awareness indication question. The awareness indication question in the second survey was designed to identify
those women who were familiar with " 'substances that manufacturers sometimes apply to the surfaces of certain products in order to
prevent things from sticking to them.' ,126 The results of the second
survey essentially corroborated the first; 81.4% of the "aware" respondents mentioned "Teflon" or "Teflon II" exclusively when asked
the name that the substances are called, and sixty percent stated
"Teflon" or "Teflon II" as the name they would use to describe the
127
products containing these substances to a store clerk or friend.
In response to YKK's surveys DuPont introduced two surveys
conducted by telephone.12 8 In the first survey, the universe selected
consisted of individuals over eighteen years of age. 29 These respondents were told: " 'Protective coatings are sometimes applied by manufacturers to the inside of household utensils in order to prevent food
and grease from sticking.' " They were then asked, " 'Do you know a
brand name or trademark for one of these coatings?' 130 Of the sixty
percent that responded affirmatively, eighty percent answered
"Teflon" when asked, " '[W]hat is that brand name or
trademark?' "'131 All respondents were then asked, " 'Can you think of
any other words or terms to describe these coatings?' 132 Sixty-eight
percent of those who had answered the prior questions with the word

Id.
Id. This statistic is virtually irrelevant, since it has long been an accepted tenet of trademark law that a trademark is not generic because customers are unaware of the manufacturer's
identity. See Bayer, 272 F. at 509.
'2 Teflon, 393 F. Supp. at 525. Of those women questioned, 89.4% indicated awareness.-Id.
127 Id.
124
121

128
129

Id.
Id.

Id. (quoting Pl. Exh. 61, Questionnaire entitled "Protective Coating Study-A"). The
awareness indication question was similiar to that used in YKK's surveys. See supra note 122 and
accompanying text. The only difference between the second question and the first question in
YKK's two surveys was that DuPont's survey requested the "brand name" while YKK's survey
asked only for the "name." Teflon, 393 F. Supp. at 525.
'13 Teflon, 393 F. Supp. at 526. By comparison, 86.1% and 81.4% of the aware respondents
in YKK's surveys answered "Teflon" when asked simply to identify a name of the product. Id.
Id. (quoting Pl. Exh. 61, Questionnaire entitled "Protective Coating Study-A").
130

132
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"Teflon" knew of no other word to describe the coating. Thirty-two
percent of that group were able to supply other terms, and the one
1 33
most frequently given was "Non-Stick.
DuPont began its second survey by explaining to its telephone
respondents the difference between a brand name and a common
name, using the example " 'Chevrolet--automobile.' 134 A brand
name, the interviewees were told, is an indicator of a product " 'made
by one company.' ",35 The interviewees were then read a list of eight
names, including "Teflon," and were asked to identify them as brand
names or common names.136 Sixty-eight percent of the respondents
identified "Teflon" as a brand name, and thirty-one percent believed
7
it was a common name.
After reviewing the four surveys, the court found that DuPont's
second telephone survey, the brand name survey, was the only one
which reflected the public's understanding of the term. 38 The court
determined that the design of the other three surveys focused the
attention of the interviewee "on supplying the inquirer a 'name',
without regard to whether the principal significance of the name
supplied was 'its indication of the nature or class of an article, rather
than an indication of origin.' ",139 The court found that the brandname survey results indicated "that the public is quite good at sorting

133
134

13138

Id.
Id.
Id. at 527 (quoting Pl. Exh. 61, Questionnaire entitled "Protective Coating Study Id. The results of this brand name survey were as follows:
NAME

BRAND

COMMON

B").

DON'T KNOW

STP
90
5
5
THERMOS
51
46
3
MARGARINE
9
91
1
TEFLON
68
31
2
JELLO
75
25
1
94
6
REFRIGERATOR
ASPIRIN
13
86
COKE
76
24
Id. at 526 n.54 (quoting P1. Exh. 61, Table 2).
"I' Id. at 526.
131 Id. at 527.
"I Id. (quoting King-Seeley, 321 F.2d at 580). The court noted the substantial similarity
between DuPont's first survey asking for "brand name or trademark" and YKK's surveys which
asked for "name or names." Id. Neither survey explained to the interviewees the difference
between brand names and common names. The court concluded that both surveys were "ambiguous on the question of whether the responses truly reflect generic use . . . to the extent
indicated." Id. at 526.
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out brand names from common names, and, for TEFLON, answers
the critical question left unanswered by the ambiguities [in the other
surveys]-that of the principal significance of the TEFLON mark to
' 40
the public.'
The court concluded that while YKK had failed to make a "clear
and convincing" showing that "Teflon" was a generic term, DuPont
had succeeded, through its brand name survey, in proving that it was
a brand name.14 1 It is important to note that while the court relied
heavily upon the brand name survey as direct proof of the primary
significance of the term in the mind of the consuming public, this was
not the sole basis for the decision. 42 In finding that YKK had not met
its burden, 43 the court also relied upon DuPont's affirmative efforts to
protect the distinctiveness of its trademark.
The Teflon court found that the brand name survey was proof of
the primary significance of the mark to the consuming public, but
that a Thermos-type survey was not probative at all.144 Evidence of
DuPont's proper use of and diligence in policing its mark was not used
as direct evidence of primary significance of the term. "45 Rather, this
evidence was seen as ". . . emphasiz[ing] . . . the gravity of defendants' burden," and as explaining why the transformation of trademark to generic term did not occur in this case. 4 Accordingly, a
trademark owner relying on the Teflon decision would believe it could
prevail in defending its mark against a claim of genericness by coming
forward with evidence of proper usage of and diligence in policing its
trademark, along with a brand name survey indicating that a majority of consumers who are aware of its product perceive the terms as a
trademark. Parker Brothers, owners of the registered trademark "Monopoly," apparently believed just that.
47
C. Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc. 1

In February of 1983, the Supreme Court refused to consider a
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision that cancelled the trademark
110Id.
at 527 (emphasis in original). While the court did not reject YKK's contention that the
surveys revealed "some evidence and examples of generic use of TEFLON by the public," it
stated that " 'some evidence' of generic usage is not sufficient." Id. at 526 n.56.
4I Id. at 528. The court stated that the burden upon the defendant was "clear and convincing" evidence, but disclaimed this standard by noting that "no matter how defendants' burden is
described, it simply has not been met on this record and the defense must fail." Id.
142

Id.

143 Id.

at 527-28.

144Id. at 526-27.
145 Id.
146
"7

at 527-28.
Id.
District Court 1, 195 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 634.
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"Monopoly."'' 48 The game "Monopoly" was first commercially produced in late 1932 or early 1933.14 1 Ralph Anspach, a professor of
economics, created the game "Anti-Monopoly" and began marketing
it in December of 1973.150 The controversy that resulted in the rendering of the term "Monopoly" as "generic" began when Anti-Monopoly,
Inc. responded to threats of legal action by Parker Brothers by bringing an action against General Mills Fun Group for a declaratory
judgment of invalidity and/or noninfringement of the "Monopoly"
trademark.' 5' In addition, Anti-Monopoly sought to have the "Monopoly" trademark cancelled, in part because it had become generic.152 Parker Brothers counterclaimed for a declaration of validity,
53
trademark infringement, and for injunctive relief.
1. The First Decision of the District Court-Anti-Monopoly,
54
Jnc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc. 1
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California held in 1977 that the "Monopoly" trademark had not

148 Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 684 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1234 (1983).
149 Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, 611 F.2d 296, 299 (9th Cir. 1979), on
remand, 515 F. Supp. 448 (N.D. Cal. 1981), rev'd and remanded, 684 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1234 (1983). Parker Brothers is an unincorporated division of
General Mills Fun Group. The game "Monopoly" was first played on college campuses by small
groups of individuals. The original producer of the game obtained a copyright and, in March
1935, assigned all rights to the game and game equipment to Parker Brothers. The game was
patented in 1935 and the patent was assigned to Parker Brothers. The patent expired in 1952. In
1935 and 1936, Parker Brothers also obtained federal trademark registration for "Monopoly.'" Id.
1w Id. at 299-300. Anti-Monopoly, Inc. was a California corporation formed by Ralph
Anspach, a professor of economics, to market his game "Anti-Monopoly." Id. at 299. Professor
Anspach initially intended to market the game under the title, "Bust the Trust, The AntiMonopoly game" but subsequently decided "Anti-Monopoly" was the better title. Id. at 300.
Professor Anspach's application for federal trademark registration was rejected by the United
States Patent and Trademark Office based on the possibility of confusion, mistake, or deception
with Parker Brothers' "Monopoly" trademark. Professor Anspach never appealed the decision.
Id.
151Brief in Opposition to Petition For a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit at 7-8, CPG Prods. Corp. v. Anti-Monopoly, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 1234
(1983). "Anti-Monopoly filed suit against Parker Brothers only after Parker Brothers turned
down Anti-Monopoly's offers of disclaimer and change of name to antimonopolist, antimonopoli
or antimonopolism." Id. at 9.
151District Court 1, 195 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 637. Anti-Monopoly also argued that both the
"Monopoly" trademark, and the patent for the game had been fraudulently obtained by Parker
Brothers. Id. The court found both arguments "lacking in merit." Id. at 638.

151 Id. at 637.
154 Id.
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become generic, and had been infringed by Anti-Monopoly. 55 In so
concluding, the district court noted that the application of the common word "monopoly" to a game was "arbitrary and unique" and
thus the 1935 and 1936 trademark registrations had been properly
granted. 156 The district court further found that the term did not
become generic after its registration, since "[t]he primary significance
of MONOPOLY. . . is not that it describes all board games involving
real estate trading but rather that it is the title of a particular and very
' 157
popular board game produced by a single company.
Anti-Monopoly submitted a survey similar to the one used in
Thermos. 158 People were asked the question: " 'Are you familiar with
business board games of the kind in which players buy, sell, mortgage
and trade city streets, utilities and railroads, build houses, collect rents
and win by bankrupting all other players, or not?' " 59 About fiftythree percent responded affirmatively. Those respondents were then
asked: " 'If you were going to buy this kind of game, what would you
ask for, that is, what would you tell the sales clerk you wanted?' "160
Eighty percent responded: "Monopoly.' 16' The court found these survey results to be unconvincing since it had determined that a ruling of
genericness required a finding that the "term monopoly now refers to
all real estate trading board games .... . .162 Judge Williams therefore
issued a permanent injunction against plaintiff's use of the mark
1 3
"Anti-Monopoly," and Anti-Monopoly appealed.
2. The First Decision of the Court of AppealsAnti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group
(Anti-Monopoly 1)164
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's
findings as to the validity of the trademark, and held that the district
155 Id. at

638-39.

151Id. at 638. The court also noted: "[a]t the most, MONOPOLY is a suggestive title validly
registered without the necessity of proof of secondary meaning." Id.
157 Id.
1, See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
150 Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 684 F.2d 1316, 1323 (9th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1234 (1983).
160 Id.
161

Id.

District Court I, 195 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 638 & n.3.
Id. at 640. The court issued the permanent injunction based upon its decision that Parker
Brothers had proved trademark infringement. Id.
164 611 F.2d 296 (9th Cir. 1979), on remand, 515 F. Supp. 448 (N.D. Cal. 1981), rev'd and
remanded, 684 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1234 (1983) [hereinafter cited
as Anti-Monopoly I].
112
163
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court had erroneously applied the genericness doctrine as set forth by
the Supreme Court in Shredded Wheat.15 The court found that the
genericness doctrine had not changed significantly since the Shredded
Wheat decision and stated that "[i]f the primary significance of the
trademark is to describe the type of product rather than the producer,
the trademark has become a generic term and is no longer a valid
trademark.' 16 6 The court noted that even though Parker Brothers is
the only producer of "Monopoly," and the public therefore must
is
associate the term "Monopoly" with that company, "the trademark' 1 67
invalid unless source identification is its primary significance."
Where there is only one source of a product, it is difficult to determine
by the public as generic or is regarded as
whether a name is regarded 68
indicating only that source. 1
The Ninth Circuit set forth the genus/species analysis as one way
of determining primary significance. 6 6 The court defined genus as "a
product category including essentially interchangeable goods made by
unique producers," and defined a species as a "sub-classifier. ' 170 A
term which identifies a genus would be generic, while a term which
identifies a particular producer's product within that genus would be
a species and could function as a trademark. The court held that the
district court had erred in defining the "genus" as " 'all board games
involving real estate trading' " and reasoned that the term "Monopoly" could be generic because the unique game which that trademark
identifies could constitute a genus unto itself. 171By first defining the
genus as "all real estate trading games" and then asking the primary
significance question, the district court, according to the Ninth Circuit, failed to resolve the crucial issue: "Do consumers use the term

165Id. at 301-04; see supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
181Anti-Monopoly 1, 611 F.2d at 304.
117 Id. at 302. This is the same de facto secondary meaning argument made by the Supreme
Court in Shredded Wheat. See supra note 48.
'6 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, at § 12:15. This determination, however, must be made
since "[s]ource identification is the only word function which trademark law is designed to
protect." Anti-Monopoly I, 611 F.2d at 304.
"9 Anti-Monopoly I, 611 F.2d at 303. According to the Ninth Circuit, the proper genus must
be identified before a determination of genericness can take place. Id.
10 Id.

(footnote omitted).

Id. at 305. The Anti-Monopoly I court reasoned that "if consumers think of MONOPOLY
as a unique game, and differentiate it from all other real estate trading games by sourceirrelevant characteristics, e.g., length of time it takes to play, or strategy involved, MONOPOLY
may constitute its own genus." Id. It must be noted, however, that a court, by expanding or
contracting the definition of a genus of products, can substantially affect the final determination
of whether a term is "generic." See 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, at § 12:6.
171
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MONOPOLY primarily to denote the product, or instead to denote its
producer?"'17 2 The appellate court accordingly remanded the case to
the district court for further proceedings to determine the primary
' 73
significance of the term "Monopoly.'
3. The Second Decision of the District CourtAnti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc.

4

On remand, the district court again found that the "Monopoly"
trademark was valid and had been infringed. 17 Judge Williams noted
that a determination of primary significance is particularly difficult
when it concerns a "single producer of a unique game.' 76 The court
permitted the presentation of additional survey evidence in order to
77
help make that determination. 1
The court accepted the results of a survey conducted by Parker
Brothers which was modeled on the brand name survey approved by
the court in Teflon. 78 That survey established that sixty-three percent
of the public perceived "Monopoly" as the "brand name" of a product, and that fifty-five percent of the recognizing group named Parker
Brothers as the producer of the "Monopoly" game. 7' The district
court, however, rejected a "motivation" survey conducted by AntiMonopoly which had been designed in accordance with the language
suggested by the circuit court in Anti-Monopoly 1 180
Anti-Monopoly's motivation survey was directed to persons who
81
had recently purchased or were about to purchase "Monopoly.'

Anti-Monopoly I, 611 F.2d at 305.
See id. at 306. The court set out an example, quoted infra at text accompanying note 253,
for the lower court to follow.
174 515 F. Supp. 448 (N.D. Cal. 1981), rev'd and remanded, 684 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1234 (1983) [hereinafter cited as District Court II].
12
"3

175 Id.

at 455.

Id. at 452-53. The court noted that normally the "primary significance" analysis "is
implemented by ascertaining whether a mark denotes a 'particular producer's goods or services.
. . [or whether] the word is identified with all such goods or services, regardless of their
suppliers.' . . . This is a straightforward task in markets where several producers manufacture
the generic item in question." Id. at 452 (quoting Surgicenters of Am., Inc. v. Medical Dental
Surgeries, Co., 601 F.2d 1011, 1016 (9th Cir. 1979)). Where there is only one producer of the
product the analysis becomes more complex. See id.; 1 J. McCArHY, supra note 2, at § 12:15.
117 District Court II, 515 F. Supp. at 452-53.
178 Id. at 454; see Teflon, 393 F. Supp. at 502; supra text accompanying notes 134-37.
119District Court II, 515 F. Supp. at 454.
180 Id.; see infra text accompanying note 253.
181 District Court II, 515 F. Supp. at 453. The first two survey questions were:
178

(1) "Are you aware of 'MONOPOLY,' the business board game produced by
ParkerBrothers?", (2) "Have you purchased MONOPOLY within the last couple of
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Those consumers were asked the open-ended question: " 'Why did
[or would] you buy "MONOPOLY"?' ",182 and the structured question: " 'Which of these two statements best expresses your meaning
when you ask [to purchase] . . . MONOPOLY in a store?' Choices:
'(1) I would like Parker Brothers' "MONOPOLY" game primarily
because I like Parker Brothers' products.' or '(2) I want "MONOPOLY" game primarily because I am interested in playing "MONOPOLY." I don't much care who makes it.' "183
Judge Williams criticized Anti-Monopoly's motivation survey,
stating that the test set forth by the Ninth Circuit requires a determination of the primary significance of the mark, not an explanation of
an actual purchaser's motivation for purchasing the game. 84 The
district court concluded that the cumulative weight of the evidence
did not prove that the primary significance of "Monopoly" was product as opposed to source.18 5 In so holding, the court followed the
rationale of the Teflon court and gave great weight to Parker Brothers'
expenditures in promoting and policing their trademark, and to the
"brand name" survey in which fifty-five percent of the public correctly identified Parker Brothers as the producer of the game. 8 6
4. The Second Decision of the Court of AppealsAnti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun
Group, Inc. (Anti-Monopoly 11)187
The court of appeals again reversed the district court, vacating as
"clearly erroneous" the district court's finding that "Monopoly" pri-

years?", or "Is it possible that you would buy 'MONOPOLY' now or in the near
future either for yourself, as a replacement, or as a gift?"
Id. (emphasis in original).
18 Id. In response to these open-ended questions, "82 % mentioned some aspect of the playing
of the game (product indicators) and only 7% mentioned the equipment and 1% spoke of price
(source indicators)." Brief in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit at 15-16, CPG Prods. Corp. v. Anti-Monopoly, Inc., 103
S. Ct. 1234 (1983).
.. District Court 11, 515 F. Supp. at 453 n.5. Thirty-two percent of those surveyed chose the
first response, and 65% chose the second. Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group,
Inc., 684 F.2d 1316, 1324 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1234 (1983).
"' District Court II, 515 F. Supp. at 454. The court noted that consumers obviously purchase
products because they desire them, but stated that "[t]he dispositive issue . . . is not why
consumers buy MONOPOLY sets, but rather, what is their understandingof the name MONOPOLY?" Id. (emphasis in original).
185

Id.

1s6 Id.

--' 684 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1234 (1983) [hereinafter cited as
Anti-Monopoly II].
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marily denotes its producer, Parker Brothers.' 88 In reaching the conclusion that "Monopoly" had become generic since it was registered,
the Anti-Monopoly II court carefully examined the proof of primary
significance accepted by Judge Williams.1 8 9 Judge Williams had ruled
that Anti-Monopoly had the burden of proving genericness "by convincing evidence."' 9 0 The circuit court ruled, however, that this
placed too heavy a burden on Anti-Monopoly, and found that the
presumption of validity in favor of a registered trademark could be
defeated merely by a preponderance of the evidence.' 9'
The circuit court agreed with Judge Williams' finding that the
evidence overwhelmingly showed that Parker Brothers had successfully promoted the game "Monopoly."' 9 2 Rather than resulting in the
protection of the mark, however, the Anti-Monopoly II court determined that this successful promotion of the term "Monopoly" as "the
name of the game" resulted in the term becoming generic.19 3 The
principal evidence offered by the parties consisted of a number of
surveys. The Ninth Circuit rejected both of Parker Brothers' surveys, a
brand name survey and a "Tide" survey, 19 4 and accepted Anti-Monopoly's Thermos-type survey and motivation survey. 9 5
The court found the brand name survey to be "no evidence" in
support of the district court's finding. 9 6 According to the Ninth Circuit, the fatal error in the brand name survey was that interviewees
were told: " 'By brand name, I mean a name like Chevrolet, which is
made by one company .... . ,,.o9 Thus, by definition, "Monopoly"
would automatically be a brand name because only one company

188 Id. at 1322.

Id. at 1321-26.
o District Court II, 515 F. Supp. at 451.

ISO

Anti-Monopoly II, 684 F.2d at 1319; see also Keebler Co. v. Rovira Biscuit Corp., 624
F.2d 366, 373 (1980) (better rule is to require only preponderance of evidence); Dan Robbins &
Assocs. v. Questor Corp., 599 F.2d 1009, 1013-14 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (defendant may satisfy
burden of proof with respect to specific defect he alleges in plaintiff's registration by preponderance of evidence). But cJ. Teflon, 393 F. Supp. at 502 ("clear and convincing" standard applied);
supra note 112 and accompanying text.
1"I Anti-Monopoly II, 684 F.2d at 1322; District Court II, 515 F. Supp. at 450. The district
court had found that "Parker Brothers has expended substantial time, energy, and money in
promoting and policing their trademark, expending over $4 million in advertising expenditures."
Id. at 454.
183 Anti-Monopoly II, 684 F.2d at 1323.
See infra text accompanying notes 200-02.
Anti-Monopoly 11, 684 F.2d at 1323-26.
I88
Id. at 1323.
Ild. (emphasis in original).
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produces the game.""8 Partly because of this built-in bias, the court
concluded that the survey was "not even some evidence" of the primary significance of "Monopoly" in the minds of consumers.'° 9
Parker Brothers introduced the "Tide" survey in an attempt to
demonstrate the absurdity of the motivation survey. 200 The "Tide"
survey was merely a duplication of the motivation survey, but instead
of analyzing the trademark "Monopoly," it tested the trademark
"Tide."' 20 1 Parker Brothers intended to, and in fact did, show that
even as strong a trademark as "Tide" would be considered generic
under the motivation test. 20 2 The Ninth Circuit, however, concluded
that the "Tide" survey was "of no relevance to this case. "203 The
court's rejection of both the defendant's surveys thus left Anti-Monopoly's Thermos-type and motivation surveys as the only direct evidence
of the primary significance of the term.
Anti-Monopoly's first survey was patterned after the survey accepted by the Thermos court. 20 4 Although acknowledging that the
King-Seeley court described the survey as only " 'generally corroborative of the court's conclusions drawn from other evidence,' ",205 and
that the Teflon court had found the Thermos-type survey to be defective,20° the Ninth Circuit nonetheless held the results of this survey to
be "compelling evidence" that a vast majority of consumers who were
aware of the product would use the name "Monopoly" when asking to
20 7
purchase the game.
The Anti-Monopoly II court found the motivation survey to be
clear support for its conclusion that the primary significance of "Monopoly" was to designate the product rather than its source. 20 8 In

198Id.
199Id. The court also noted that on cross-examination and redirect examination of Parker
Brothers' expert witness, it became clear that this survey was nothing more than a duplication of
the Teflon survey and that the witness had no opinion as to the relevance of this survey to any
issue in the case. Id.
100 Id. at 1326.
201

Id.

See District Court II, 515 F. Supp. at 453 n.5.
Anti-Monopoly II, 684 F.2d at 1326. The Ninth Circuit commented that "if the test
formulated in Anti-Monopoly I could be mechanically extended to the very different subject of
detergents, then Procter and Gamble might have cause for alarm." Id.
Id. at 1323; see supra text accompanying notes 158-62.
,0 Anti-Monopoly 11, 684 F.2d at 1324 (quoting King-Seeley, 321 F.2d at 580); see supra text
accompanying note 90.
21'
Anti-Monopoly 11, 684 F.2d at 1324; see supra note 144 and accompanying text.
207 Anti-Monopoly I1,684 F.2d at 1324.
202
203

204

208

Id. at 1326.
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addressing the district court's contention that the survey merely
sought consumer motivation, 20 9 the Ninth Circuit reiterated its position stated in Anti-Monopoly I that, in determining primary significance, "what was relevant was the sense in which a purchaser used
the word 'Monopoly' when asking for the game by that name. ' 210 The
court characterized the motivation survey as a "reasonable effort" to
ascertain the sense in which purchasers used the term.2 1 ' Thus, the
Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court was "clearly erroneous" in finding that the primary significance of the term "Monopoly"
was source.

2 12

The Anti-Monopoly II decision has been criticized as an "aberrant deviation" from traditional trademark law. 21 3 Most critics insist
that the Ninth Circuit's decision has introduced consumer motivation
as the new standard against which genericness should be tested. 1 4 A
careful reading of the Ninth Circuit's decision, however, shows that
this is not the case.
The Ninth Circuit in both Anti-Monopoly decisions had said very
clearly that all determinations of genericness should involve the primary significance analysis set forth by the Supreme Court in Shredded
Wheat. 21 5 The Ninth Circuit did not create a new test, but rather
employed the motivation survey as one means of directly answering

Id. at 1325; see supra note 184 and accompanying text.
Anti-Monopoly II, 684 F.2d at 1325; see Anti-Monopoly 1, 611 F.2d at 305-06.
211 Anti-Monopoly If, 684 F.2d at 1325.
212 Id. at 1326.
213 See In re DC Comics, Inc. 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 394, 404 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (Nies, J.,

20

210

concurring) (questioned validity of consumer motivation as measure of primary significance);
Hemp, A Lot Rides on a Good Name, Trademark Law Is Unsettled, N.Y. Times, Sept. 7, 1983,
at Dl, col. 2; Lefkowitz & Graham, Court Rules that 'Monopoly' Has Suffered Genericide,
Legal Times, Mar. 7, 1983, at 14, col. 1.
214 See Note, Genericide: Cancellation of a Registered Trademark, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 666
(1983); Lefkowitz & Graham, supra note 213. Seven amicus briefs were filed in support of
General Mill's petition for a writ of certiorari. The majority of these briefs argued that the Ninth
Circuit's decision promulgated a new test of genericness. See, e.g., Motion for Leave to File Brief
Amicus Curiae and Brief Amicus Curiae of the United States Trademark Association at 4, CPG
Prods. Corp. v. Anti-Monopoly, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 1234 (1983).
The Ninth Circuit held instead that the validity of the term at issue should be tested
not on the basis of its primary significance to the public but solely on the basis of the
Circuit Court's interpretation of reasons given by some members of the public as to
why they had bought or would buy the product sold under that term. Application of
such a test could jeopardize the validity of a significant number of important and
valuable trademarks.
Id.
215 Anti-Monopoly H1, 684 F.2d at 1324; Anti-Monopoly 1, 611 F.2d at 302.
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the crucial question: "Do consumers use the term MONOPOLY primarily to denote the product, or instead to denote its producer? 21
The court characterized the motivation survey as a good attempt
to determine the sense in which a purchaser used the word when
asking for the game by that name, 21 7 but neither stated nor implied
that this test was to be applied in lieu of the primary significance
analysis. Further, while the Ninth Circuit gave great weight to AntiMonopoly's motivation survey, the court also relied on a Thermostype survey, Parker Brothers' intensive promotion of the "Monopoly"
name, and the descriptive nature of the term itself. 21 8 Although critics
are correct in asserting that the motivation survey should not be the
test of genericness, the Anti-Monopoly II decision does not threaten to
make it so. The motivation survey was merely a survey accepted by
one court as evidence of the primary significance of a word in a case
21 9
involving a unique product made by a single manufacturer.
III.

ANALYSIS

It has been forty-five years since the Supreme Court stated, in
Shredded Wheat, that in order for a term to be generic its primary
significance in the minds of the consuming public must be the product
and not the product's producer. 220 After forty-five years of litigation,
however, the courts are still wrestling with this amorphous concept.
As demonstrated by the foregoing analysis, no definitive method of
proving primary significance has emerged from the courts' opinions.
It has become clear, however, that in making a determination of the
primary significance of a term, the courts will weigh a number of
factors, including both direct and indirect evidence.
The indirect evidence the courts have considered has taken many
forms, including the trademark owner's misuse of the mark in advertising or packaging, 22' the diligence with which the owner policed its

216

Anti-Monopoly 1, 611 F.2d at 305; see Anti-Monopoly I, 684 F.2d at 1324-26.

217 Anti-Monopoly II, 684 F.2d at 1325.
211 See id. at 1322-24.
219 See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
220 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.

221See Folsom & Teply, supra note 13, at 1324; see, e.g., Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co.,
163 U.S. 169, 181 (1896) (improper usage of "Singer" in labeling); Donald F. Duncan, Inc. v.
Royal Tops Mfg. Co., 343 F.2d 655, 663 (7th Cir. 1965) (improper use of "Yo-Yo" in sales
literature and advertising); King-Seeley, 321 F.2d at 579 (improper use of "Thermos" in sales
literature); DuPont Cellophane, 85 F.2d at 78-80 (improper use of "Cellophane" in advertising).
Misuse of the trademark includes the promotional efforts of trademark owners aimed at encouraging the public to use their trademarks as "household words." Folsom & Teply, supra note 13,
at 1325; see infra note 229.
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22 3
mark, 222 and the availability of alternative generic terms or phrases.
This type of evidence is generally used to explain the transition from
trademark to generic phrase. 224 These factors can be used offensively
to show the cause of this transition, and defensively to show that no
such cause existed. In Thermos, the defendant used evidence of KingSeeley's misuse of the mark in advertising and its lack of diligence in
policing the improper usage of others offensively to show that causation. 25 In Teflon, the plaintiff DuPont defensively employed evidence
of its proper usage of the mark and the diligence with which it policed
the misuse of others in order to show that no such cause existed. 226 In
both instances the courts' rulings were consistent with this evidence.
In Anti-Monopoly, Parker-Brothers attempted a defensive use of this
type of evidence by showing that it had spent time, energy, and
money in promoting and policing use of the term "Monopoly. ' 227 The
district court relied in part upon this evidence in finding the term was
not generic.2 28 The circuit court, however, found that this evidence
showed only that Parker Brothers had so successfully promoted "Monopoly" as the " 'name of the game,' that it became generic. '22 9 Thus,
in Anti-Monopoly, the same evidence, that of promotion of the mark,
was used both offensively and defensively.
The availability or absence of a short and simple alternative
230
name for the product is another factor considered by the courts.
The Bayer court, for example, found that aspirin had become generic,
in part because acetyl salicylic acid was not a term which could be
easily used by the public to identify the drug. 231 Yet, as was pointed
out by the Thermos court, the availability of an alternative term for
the product is, by itself, insufficient to prove nongenericness. 232 The
trademark may still be determined to be generic, even in the presence

22 Folsom & Teply, supra note 13, at 1325; see, e.g., Thermos, 321 F.2d at 578-79; DuPont
Cellophane, 85 F.2d at 78-80 (trademark owners acquiesced in generic use of their terms by
public and media for extended periods of time).
23 Folsom & Teply, supra note 13, at 1324; see infra text accompanying notes 230-33.
224 Folsom & Teply, supra note 13, at 1324.
225 See supra notes 61-70 and accompanying text.
226 See supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
227 District Court 1, 195 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 637.

228

Id.

229

Anti-Monopoly II, 684 F.2d at 1323. Trademark owners must police their mark as well as

promote it. If the mark is promoted as the common name of the product, this promotion is
tantamount to misuse, and may contribute to the mark becoming generic. See Folsom & Teply,
supra note 13, at 1329 n.41.
230 See Folsom & Teply, supra note 13, at 1324; Note, supra note 214, at 674.
231 Bayer, 272 F. at 510-11.
232 King-Seeley, 321 F.2d at 580. The court stated that "the test is not what is available as an
alternative to the public, but what the public's understanding is of the word that it uses." Id.
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of an adequate alternative term, if the party alleging genericness can
show through direct evidence that the contested trademark has be2 33
come synonymous with the alternative term.
While evidence of the trademark owner's misuse of the mark, the
owner's lack of diligence in policing the mark, and the nonavailability
of alternative terms can be used effectively to explain the transition
from trademark to generic term, 234 it is not direct evidence of the
primary significance of the term; rather, it is indirect evidence, analagous to a causation argument in negligence law. Just as causation
alone is insufficent to prove negligence, presenting only indirect evidence of factors that may contribute to the deterioration of a mark is
insufficient to prove genericness. A party claiming negligence must
come forth with evidence of "harm" to complete his case. So, too, in
order to prove genericness it must be shown that the primary significance of the contested term in the minds of the consuming public is
product rather than source.
To prove primary significance, one must engage in a two-step
analysis. First, the significance of the term must be determined-that
is, does the consuming public understand the term as identifying the
product, or the product's source? Once this has been ascertained, a
comparison must take place to prove which understanding is primary.
If a substantial portion of the public understands the term to denote
simply the product, then the trademark has become generic.
Generic uses of a trademark in trade publications, magazines,
newspapers, patents,2 35 as well as dictionary citations, 236 are seen as
evidence of the public's understanding of the term. While such evi233 See id.
234 See 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, at § 12.2(G).
23 See 1 J. GILsoN, supra note 1, at § 2.02[2]; Folsom & Teply, supra note 13, at 1328.

Evidence of public usage has also been tendered in the form of correspondence, memoranda,
order forms, and testimony from members of the purchasing public. Id.; see, e.g., Thermos, 207
F. Supp. at 19-20. The weight given to media clips varies in direct proportion to the amount of
such usage that can be shown. Compare Thermos, 207 F. Supp. at 20 (hundreds of clippings
from publications showing literally thousands of literary and editorial uses of "Thermos" given
substantial weight) with Teflon, 393 F. Supp. at 524-25 (various advertisements, published
material, and patents showing examples of generic usage considered isolated examples of public
usage and given little weight).
231 1 J. GILSON, supra note 1, at § 2.02[2]. "The inclusion of a trademark in a dictionary is not
conclusive on the question of whether it has become or is legally generic .
I..."
Id. The court
may use the presence of the term or its absence in the dictionary to draw inferences for or against
genericness. Id.; see also Miller Brewing Co. v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 919
(D.R.I. 1980) (dictionary meanings create at most rebuttable presumption of consumer perception), rev'd on other grounds, 655 F.2d 5 (1st Cir. 1981); In re Minnetonka, Inc., 212 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 772, 778 (TTAB 1981) (appearance of term as generic in dictionaries "is not conclusive, if
for no other reason than that this would endow editors of such works with the power to destroy
trademarks, merely by defining them generically"). But cf. Surgicenters of Am., Inc. v. Medical
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dence shows what some portion of the public understands by the
term, it does not necessarily show the "primary" understanding of the
term by the public. 237 Consumer surveys are capable of combining
both the "understanding" and "primariness" elements of the primary
significance analysis. This can be accomplished by establishing the
public understanding of the trademark through quantifiable results
which indicate the relative significance of the different public perceptions of the term. As such, the consumer survey is the only direct
23
evidence of primary significance. 1
A basic problem remains, however, in deciding what type of
survey will be considered probative by the courts. The Thermos-type
survey was disregarded by the Teflon court, 23 but regarded as probative by the Anti-Monopoly II court. 240 The brand name survey was
considered probative by the Teflon court, 24' but was considered totally inappropriate by the Anti-Monopoly II court. 24 2 Recently, in
Nestle Co. v. Chester's Market, Inc. ,243 the District Court of Connecticut invalidated the trademark "Toll House" as applied to cookies
because it had become generic. 244 In so doing, the court disregarded a
Thermos-type suivey,2 45 a brand name survey, 246 and a motivation
Dental Surgeries, Co., 601 F.2d 1011, 1015 n.ll (9th Cir. 1979) (presence of term in dictionary
often seen as persuasive evidence of how term is understood and used by consuming public).
237 1 J. GILSON, supra note 1, at § 2.02[2]. But cf. Keebler Co. v. Rovira Biscuit Corp., 624
F.2d 366, 375 (lst Cir. 1980) (indirect evidence can establish genericness; direct evidence such as
consumer surveys desirable but not necessary).
211 1 J. MCCARTHY, Supra note 2, at § 12.2(G).
239 See supra text accompanying note 144.
240 See supra text accompanying note 207.
241 See supra text accompanying note 144.
242 See supra text accompanying notes 196-99.
243 571 F. Supp. 763 (D. Conn. 1983).
214Id. The district court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment and found
that to most consumers, "Toll House" was associated with a chocolate chip cookie using a certain
recipe, not the product of a specific manufacturer. Id.
245 Id. at 776. The Thermos-type survey was not a complete duplication of the survey
accepted by the Thermos court. Id. It asked only two questions, which read:
[1.] Now I want to ask you about cookies that have small pieces of chocolate in
them. I am talking about cookies that you or someone else might make or cookies
that you or someone else might buy. My first question is this: If you were shopping or
if you were talking with someone, what basic product word or words would you use
in referring to cookies that have small pieces of chocolate in them?
[2.] Any other basic product words?
Id. at 771. The court found that the survey merely showed that "chocolate chip" was the answer
most frequently given (75.8% as opposed to 13.8% for Toll House), id. at 771, 776, and as such
"is a more frequently used generic term for cookies that have small pieces of chocolate in them
than is Toll House." Id. at 776. The court noted that "[w]hat is important is the primary
significance of that word in the minds of consumers, not that they use another word more
frequently in describing the same product." Id.
246 Id. at 777. The court questioned whether "a brand name survey could under any circumstances be evidence to support a finding of genericness," and noted that even if it could, there
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survey, 247 and relied instead upon marketing surveys not designed to
prove genericness, but rather commissioned years earlier by Nestle to
"guide the company's future participation in the baking market.

'248

It

is thus evident that one cannot merely duplicate a survey that was
accepted in a previous trademark case and be assured of its relevance
in another case. 249 There will always be a number of differing but
statistically valid methodologies, and as long as they adhere to the
principles governing the reception of survey evidence adopted by the
Judicial Conference to the United States, they may be admitted into
evidence. 250 All surveys, however, must meet the threshold requirement of relevance to the issue to be decided in the case. While the
Thermos, Teflon, and Anti-Monopoly opinions do not point to any
one methodology that will be accepted as relevant to the issue of
primary significance in every instance, they do serve to point out those
methods which are most viable.
The motivation survey was an attempt by Anti-Monopoly to
measure the primary significance of a term used to name a unique
item made by a single producer. When dealing with a trademark of
an item made by only one producer it is difficult, if not impossible, to
determine whether the name is regarded by the public as primarily
identifying either the product or its source since, in a single producer
situation, "[c]onsumers probably don't distinguish whether the name
is the generic name of that 'thing' sold or indicates that 'thing' sold
only by one seller.

'251

When the consumer thinks of the name, the

was a defect in Nestle's survey. The key term on the list of terms to be identified was simply "Toll
House" and not "Toll House cookies," and thus respondents who indicated that "Toll House" was
a brand name may have been referring to "Toll House" chocolate morsels. Id.
"I Id. at 772-73. The motivation-type survey was deemed inadmissible by the court because it
was not timely submitted. The court found that even if this survey were admitted, the survey
results were irrelevant since the study ascertained only consumer motivation in purchasing "Toll
House" chocolate morsels, and the issue it was deciding concerned only Toll House cookies. Id. at
773 n.6.
248 Id. at 770, 776. The court noted that these marketing surveys "clearly probed the primary
significance of the term Toll House in the minds of consumers." Id. at 776. The "Detailed
Findings" section of one of the surveys concluded that " '[t]he primary association with the Toll
House name, as could be expected, relates to chocolate-chocolate chip cookies, chocolate bits,
etc.' " Id. at 770. This "finding" may have strongly influenced the court because this statement
was the equivalent of an admission that the term was generic.
249 Id. at 777; see Anti-Monopoly II, 684 F.2d at 1323.
1-5 See supra note 79.
25'
1 J. MCCATHY, supra note 2, at § 12:15; see also District Court I1, 515 F. Supp. at 453
("In the case of the single producer of a unique item, it is a difficult and delicate task to separate
product from source characteristics as they appear in the consumer's mind.").
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consumer must automatically think of one producer, because only one
producer makes the product.
Anti-Monopoly's motivation survey was one method of dealing
with this very difficult problem. The Ninth Circuit in Anti-Monopoly
II characterized their previous decision in Anti-Monopoly I as clearly
stating that what was relevant in determining primary significance
was "the sense in which a purchaser used the word 'Monopoly' when
asking for the game by that name. 2 52 By way of illustration, the AntiMonopoly I court set forth the following example:
It may be that when a customer enters a game store and asks
for MONOPOLY, he means: "I would like Parker Brothers' version
of a real estate trading game, because I like Parker Brothers' products. Thus, I am not interested in board games made by AntiMonopoly, or anyone other than Parker Brothers." On the other
hand, the consumer may mean: "I want a 'Monopoly' game. Don't
bother showing me Anti-Monopoly, or EASY MONEY, or backgammon. I am interested in
playing the game of Monopoly. I don't
' 253
much care who makes it."
The motivation survey incorporated this exact phrasing into the responses to the structured question in the survey which asked "[W]hich
of these two statements best expresses your meaning when you ask [to
purchase] . . .MONOPOLY in a store?" 254 The court in Anti-Monopoly II saw the motivation survey as a reasonable attempt to determine
the sense in which the consumer used the word. 255 The survey, however, has been vigorously criticized as measuring consumer motivation
25
instead of consumer perception. 1
This criticism is valid. By asking "what is your meaning when
you ask to purchase," one will get answers that reflect the consumer's
motivation in purchasing the game. The buyer's motivation for making a given purchase, however, does not necessarily reflect the primary significance in the consumer's mind of the name of the product

252 Anti-Monopoly
253

II, 684 F.2d at 1325.
Anti-Monopoly I, 611 F.2d at 305-06.

District Court II, 515 F. Supp. at 453 n.5.
Anti-Monopoly II, 684 F.2d at 1325.
258 See, e.g., In re DC Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d 1042, 1054 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (Nies, J.,concurring) (consideration of purchaser motivation is "an esoteric and extraneous inquiry"); Lefkowitz
& Graham, supra note 213, at 14 ("genericness ... depends not on any perception that the
public may have . . . but rather on what motivates . . . purchasers to buy the trademarked
product . . .").
Seven amicus briefs were filed in support of Parker Brothers' petition to the
Supreme Court for issuance of a writ of certiorari to review the Anti-Monopoly II decision. All
seven argued that the motivation survey does not measure consumer understanding of the term.
:5

255
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which he has requested. The only reasonable explanation for the court
giving the survey such great weight is that it echoed the court's prior
language, by which the court felt bound. This does not, however,
change the fact that the motivation survey is not at all probative of
primary significance. The motivation survey was designed specifically
to7
in response to the circuit court's suggestion in Anti-Monopoly I as 25
how genericness might be established in single-producer situations.
The utility of the motivation survey in future trademark cases involving single producers is questionable, however, since it failed to measure the public's understanding of the term. A better approach might
be that suggested by Professor McCarthy:
The prime question is: What does the public call this "thing"? If, to
the public, the "thing" is called by the term that the seller intends
as a trademark, then it is not a mark at all-it is generic. But if the
public calls the "thing" by some name other than the mark, then
the mark probably does function as a mark even though there is
...no one else on the market with the "thing. "258
This inquiry is simple in its form and neutral in its approach,
since it concentrates solely on what the public calls the item without
reference to why they might purchase it. Thus, the significance of the
term is the focus of the inquiry, rather than the significance of the
product as it relates to a buyer's motive in making a purchase. By
eliminating the extraneous element of motivation, McCarthy's approach is a purer determinant of the primary significance of the term
259
in the very difficult single-producer situation.
Although severely criticized by the Anti-Monopoly II court, and
accepted as relevant to the issue of primary significance only by the
Teflon court, the brand name survey can still be useful if properly
constructed. The brand name surveys submitted in both Teflon and
Anti-Monopoly began by using the example "Chevrolet--automobile"
to explain the difference between a brand name and a common
name. 260 They defined a brand name as a name of an item made by
only one company, and a common name as the name of an item made
by a number of different companies. 26 ' The Anti-Monopoly II court
257 See supra text accompanying note 253.
25 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 12:15, at 434.
259 McCarthy's test may be implemented by a "blind test" approach. Consumers could be
presented with a product that has been stripped of all trademark identification and asked,
"What would you call this product?" If they use the trademark as the response to this question,
then the trademark is generic.
20 See supra text accompanying notes 134 & 197.
20' See id.
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noted that the survey had no evidentiary value in a single-source
situation, since the name of an item produced by a single producer
26 2
would always, by definition, be a brand name.
The Teflon case, however, was a situation in which more than
one producer made the non-stick coatings product. Thus, the definition of a brand name as the name of an item made by one company
would not appear to have biased the results of the survey, since
"Teflon," unlike "Monopoly," would not by definition always be a
brand name. Consumers might, in accord with the definitions, associate the term "Teflon" with non-stick coatings made by other producers and therefore identify it as the common name of the product.
Those who perceived "Teflon" as being made by only one company,
however, could identify it as a brand name. The definitions, therefore, did not in any way dictate their choices. Accordingly, the Teflon
court's acceptance and the Anti-Monopoly court's rejection of the
brand name survey appear to have been entirely proper.
One way to avoid potential criticism of the brand name survey is
to construct a survey in which brand names and common names are
not defined in terms of the number of producers of the product. The
plaintiff in Nestle, for example, commissioned a brand name survey in
which the interviewees were told: "a brand name is a special name
that identifies the manufacturer or the source of a product, while a
'26 3
common name is a general category name for the product itself.
These definitions would thus be applicable to both single and multiple
producer situations, since the existence of a brand name or common
name is not dependent upon the number of producers making the
product with which the term is associated. It might be noted that the
Nestle court did not reject the survey because of any defect in the
survey definitions. The court disregarded the survey because the survey listed simply "Toll House" among the key terms to be identified,
while the dispute concerned the trademark significance of the term
"Toll House" as used in conjunction with the word "cookies. "264
The conclusion to be drawn from these cases is that the brand
name survey would probably be an effective means of proving primary significance, subject to certain conditions. The trademark term
that appears in the survey must be the exact one at issue, and the
definitions of "brand name" and "common name" should be neutral,
as discussed above, in order to avoid biasing the results. Once these

262

See supra text accompanying note 198.

263 Nestle Co., 571 F. Supp. at 763.
264

See supra note 246.
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conditions have been met, there would appear to be no reason to
reject the results of a brand name survey as evidence of the primary
significance of a trademark.
The Thermos survey attempted to measure consumer usage, and
thereby consumer understanding, of the term "Thermos. ' 26 5 The survey asked the following key questions:
[1] If you were going to buy one of these containers tomorrowthat is, the type that keeps food and beverages hot or cold ...
What would you ask for-that is, what would you tell the clerk you
wanted?
[2] Can you think of any other words that you would use to ask for
a container that keeps liquids hot or cold?
[3] If you were going to describe one of these containers to a friend
of yours-what words would come to your mind first to describe a
container that keeps liquids hot or cold?
[4] Do you know the names of any manufacturers who make these
containers that keep liquds [sic] hot or cold?
[5] Can you name any trade-marks or brand names that are used
266
on these containers?
In the first question the survey takers were attempting to determine whether consumers at the point of purchase used the term
"Thermos" as the common name of the product. The defect in this
question, however, is that if a person simply responds "Thermos," one
is unable to distinguish whether the respondent is using the term in its
source-designating sense or in a generic sense. 26 7 In other words, were
they asking for any vacuum bottle, or a "Thermos" brand vacuum
bottle?
The second key question in the Thermos survey is not at all
probative of the primary significance of the term. While the availability of alternative terms may be one piece of indirect evidence considered by the court,26 "the test [for genericness] is not what is available
as an alternative to the public," but what is the public's understanding
of the disputed term. 269 The fourth key question in the survey sought
to measure consumer awareness of the identity of the manufacturer.
This inquiry is also irrelevant, since it has long been recognized that

Thermos, 207 F. Supp. at 20.
Id. at 21 n.8.
267 This defect was recognized by the Teflon court. See supra text accompanying note 139.
268 See supra text accompanying notes 230-33.
266 King-Seeley, 321 F.2d at 580.
285

266
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trademark validity does not require that the public know the identity
270
of the trademark owner.
The third key question, like the first, was designed to ascertain
whether consumers used and understood the term "Thermos" as the
common name of the product. This question, however, does not suffer
from the same defect as question one, since it specifically asks what
words are used to describe the product? Thus, a consumer responding
"Thermos" to this question is indeed using it in a generic sense. While
a "Thermos" response would show that the term was used to designate
the product, this alone is not sufficient to show that the primary
significance of the term is to designate the product rather than its
source. Trademark law has long recognized the principle that a valid
trademark can perform the dual functions of identifying both product
and source. 271 A trademark only becomes generic when the sourcedesignating function is no longer primary. 272 Therefore, although a
significant segment of the public may respond "Thermos" to question
three, and it can thereby be shown that they understand the term as
designating the product, this is not conclusive. It is, rather, only half
of the inquiry. The survey must further probe whether the consumers
also use and understand the term as a trademark. The fifth and final
key question accomplishes this by asking a question that can only be
answered in terms of trademarks or brand names that the consumer
associates with the product. It therefore measures only the trademark
significance of the term. These two questions take into consideration
the dual functions of trademarks since the results of question three
prove the term's generic significance, and the results of question five
prove its trademark significance. A comparison of the responses to
questions three and five can then be made in order to determine
which understanding is primary.
The relevance of the Thermos survey as an indicator of primary
significance may be questioned because it was disapproved by the

270 See Bayer, 272 F. at 509 (trademark can be valid if consumers know product comes from
single, although anonymous, source); Feathercombs, Inc. v. Solo Prods. Corp., 306 F.2d 251,
255 (2d Cir. 1962); 3 R. CALLMANN, supra note 1, § 84.1, at 1628.
' See, e.g., Coca-Cola Co. v. Koke Co., 254 U.S. 143, 146 (1920) ("[i]t hardly would be too
[W]e see no reason
much to say that the drink characterizes the name as much as the drink ....
to doubt that . . . it has acquired a secondary meaning in which perhaps the product is more
emphasized than the producer but to which the producer is entitled."); Selchow & Righter Co.
v. McGraw-Hill Book Co., 439 F. Supp. 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (trademark no less valid because it
identifies both product and source), aff'd, 580 F.2d 25 (2d Cir. 1978); see generally Swann,
supra note 91.
272 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, at § 12:2(c); see supra text accompanying note 48.
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Teflon court.27 3 This rejection, however, should not significantly detract from the survey's future effectiveness since in Teflon neither
defendant, YKK, nor plaintiff, DuPont, utilized the survey properly.
YKK's survey only made half the inquiry necessary to a determination
of primary significance. Although YKK asked the respondents what
name they would use to describe the item to a store clerk or friend,
they never asked the balancing question, "Can you name any tradenames or brand names that are used on these items?" Thus, while
YKK was able to show that a substantial majority of consumers would
use the contested term to describe the product, they were not able to
show that this was its primary significance. They did not ask the
companion question concerning trademarks, and therefore no comparison could be made to determine which significance was primary.
DuPont, however, commissioned a survey which did ask the companion question: " 'Do you know a brand name or trademark for one of
these coatings?' ",274 This survey showed that a great majority of consumers understood "Teflon" as a trademark. 27 5 One can only speculate
what the results would have been had these two questions been included in the same survey. But when one compares the results of the
two questions, they show that a great majority of the public understood the term as indicating both source and product, and thus that it
276
probably was not generic.
The relevance of the Thermos-type survey was legitimately questioned by the Teflon court, since the surveys presented in that case
were improperly designed. As the foregoing analysis shows, if questions three and five were included in one survey, the elements of
"primariness" and "significance" of the term would have been proven.
Thus, if properly constructed, the Thermos-type survey apparently
continues to be a viable means of proving primary significance.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The "primary significance" analysis set forth by the Supreme
Court in Shredded Wheat remains the standard against which a deter-

173See supra text accompanying note 144.
274 Teflon, 393 F. Supp. at 525 (quoting P1. Exh. 61. Questionnaire entitled "Protective
Coating Study-A").

175Id. at 527.
271 Id. YKK had conducted two very similar surveys. The results of the first survey showed

that 71.7% used"Teflon" descriptively, and the second survey showed that 81.4 % used "Teflon"
descriptively. Id. at 525. DuPont's survey showed that 80% of those questioned understood
"Teflon" as a trademark. Id. at 526. A comparison of these results does not clearly show the term
to be generic. Thus, the presumption of validity in favor of registered trademarks should govern.
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mination of genericness will be made. It is a very difficult standard to
apply, since it calls for a probe into the minds of the consuming
public. While there is no definitive method of proving this amorphous
concept, the opinions analyzed herein show that an attorney desiring
to prove genericness must come to court armed with both indirect and
direct evidence of the primary significance of the contested term.
If properly utilized, the Thermos-type survey and the brand
name survey represent viable methods of proving primary significance. When using the Thermos-type survey, the attorney must ensure that both the product-denoting question (number three) and the
source-denoting question (number five) are asked because without
both questions a comparison of responses could not be made to determine which significance is primary. When using the brand name
survey, the attorney must ensure that the survey defines both brand
name and common name in source-neutral terms, and that the term
which appears in the survey is the exact trademark at issue.
Both the Thermos-type survey and the brand name survey can be
effectively used in multiple producer situations and, if properly designed, appear to be valid in single producer situations. It is extremely
difficult to determine primary significance in a single producer situation, since whenever the consumer thinks of the trademark; he must
automatically think of the one producer who makes the trademarked
item. Therefore, an attorney faced with a single producer situation
may think it wise to avoid surveys that attempt to measure primary
significance in quantifiable terms and opt instead for the method
espoused by Professor McCarthy, in which people are simply asked,
"What do you call the thing?" The motivation survey, though accepted by the Ninth Circuit as proof of primary significance of a term
in a single producer situation, should never be used, since it does not
reflect the primary significance of the term but rather the consumer's
motivation for making a given purchase. The motivation survey was
merely a response to the Ninth Circuit's suggestion of how a determination of primary significance could be made in the Anti-Monopoly
case. As such, the survey amounted to no than a legal argument in a
particular case.
No matter which survey an attorney chooses, the court is likely to
give greater weight to the direct survey evidence when the results of
the survey are corroborated by strong indirect evidence since the court
is not then faced with making a determination based upon competing
statistics alone. Thus, ari attorney who is able to come to court armed
with strong indirect evidence which supports the results of a statistically valid, properly designed survey can be reasonably confident of
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proving his or her case. Even so, the primary significance analysis is in
essence a subjective test, and the simple truth is that sometimes no
amount of evidence can take the place of the gut feeling that the court
itself may have about a contested term.
Susan Sangillo Bellifemine

